Article
Warning! Clear Labels Lead to Better Defense Protection for Manufacturers in Louisiana
Published: Jun 6, 2025

A recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision confirmed that clear and express warning labels are a powerful defense for manufacturers against product liability claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA), especially when injuries arise from a consumer’s misuse of a product contrary to those warnings.
In Hardisty v. Walker, the LASC clarified what constitutes “reasonably anticipated use” of a product under the LPLA, emphasizing that the concept does not mean a manufacturer is liable for every conceivable foreseeable use of a product, especially when the use is explicitly warned against. Manufacturers doing business in Louisiana now have a clearer blueprint supporting the effectiveness of robust and explicit warning labels, which can prove crucial in defending product liability lawsuits in this state.
Product Warning Labels Play Key Role in Louisiana Lawsuits
It’s no stretch to say that people use products every single day. From the food we eat to the machines we operate, products can come in many shapes in sizes and can serve a variety of functions. In the industrial setting, products can provide utility to the businesses that purchase them by improving efficiency and output. At the same time, though, products can pose risks to the individuals who use them, including the risk of injury if the product isn’t used properly. That is precisely why manufacturers provide warning labels – to inform consumers about potential risks of misusing a product and, correspondingly, to prevent injury to the user.
In Louisiana, product warning labels play a key role in lawsuits filed against product manufacturers arising from injuries allegedly caused by their products. These lawsuits fall under the purview of the LPLA, which establishes the exclusive theories of liability against manufacturers for damage caused by their products.
Under the LPLA, a “manufacturer is liable to a claimant for damage proximately caused by a characteristic of the product that renders the product unreasonably dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or another person or entity.” La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.54(A).
There are four ways that a product can be “unreasonably dangerous” under the LPLA (See La. Rev. Stat. §§ 9:2800.55-9:2800:58):
- in construction or composition;
- in design;
- because of an inadequate warning; or
- because it fails to conform to an express warranty.
Regardless of which of these theories a plaintiff asserts, however, the plaintiff must establish that his or her damages arose from a “reasonably anticipated use” of the product, which the LPLA defines as “a use or handling of a product that the product’s manufacturer should reasonably expect of an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances.” La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.53(7).
Breaking Down the Hardisty Decision and “Reasonably Anticipated Use”
Is it a “reasonably anticipated use” of a product when someone gets hurt by using it in a way that the manufacturer warned against, such that the manufacturer can be found liable for the user’s injuries under the LPLA? In Hardisty, the Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately found that there was no “reasonably anticipated use” under the circumstances of the plaintiff’s case.
The case arose at a worksite where the plaintiff and a coworker were trying to move a bulldozer that was stuck in the mud. They attached chains from a tractor to the bulldozer in an attempt to pull it from the mud. The plaintiff got inside the bulldozer’s operator’s compartment while his coworker operated the tractor. As they tried to tow the bulldozer, one of the chains snapped and flew backward, breaking the glass of the operator’s compartment and striking plaintiff in the face and head. The plaintiff filed suit against several defendants, including Caterpillar, the manufacturer of the bulldozer, claiming that Caterpillar was liable under the LPLA because the bulldozer was “unreasonably dangerous.”
Caterpillar moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff’s attempt to pull the bulldozer from the mud with chains was not a “reasonably anticipated use” of the bulldozer. In support of its motion, Caterpillar cited the bulldozer’s operations manual, which explicitly warned the user “Do not use a chain for pulling a disabled machine. A chain link can break. This action may cause personal injury.”
The plaintiff opposed Caterpillar’s motion, asserting that there were questions of material fact over whether Caterpillar knew or should have known that users were using the product in contravention of the warning. As support for this argument, the plaintiff relied principally on the affidavit of his expert engineer, who opined, “Caterpillar clearly knew that operators of its dozers would attempt to use a chain to tow its dozers, because Caterpillar attempted to warn against such use….”
The district court agreed with the plaintiff and denied Caterpillar’s motion on the question of whether the plaintiff was engaged in a reasonably anticipated use of the product at the time of his injury.
Following the court of appeal’s summary denial of Caterpillar’s application for supervisory writ, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted Caterpillar’s writ application, reversed the district court’s ruling, and rendered summary judgment in Caterpillar’s favor, dismissing the claims against it.
In reaching its decision, the Court explained that the “reasonably anticipated use” requirement does not mean that a manufacturer is responsible for accounting for every conceivable foreseeable use of a product. The Court also explained that a manufacturer’s “knowledge of the potential and actual intentional abuse of its product does not create a question of fact on the question of reasonably anticipated use.”
Additionally, the Court recognized that numerous lower courts have found the “reasonably anticipated use” requirement lacking “[w]hen a manufacturer expressly warns against using the product in a certain way in clear and direct language” because “it is expected that an ordinary consumer would not use the product in contravention of the express warning.”
The Court then examined the evidence submitted by the parties.
The Court noted that Caterpillar produced undisputed evidence showing that its owner’s manual explicitly warned users against using chains to tow a disabled machine, as well as evidence showing that it was not aware of any other lawsuits, claims, reports, or incidents involving the use of a chain to tow a disabled machine. This evidence, the Court found, satisfied Caterpillar’s burden of proof as the mover, and as a result, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to produce specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial existed.
The Court found the plaintiff’s expert’s opinion that Caterpillar knew of the danger because it “attempted to warn against such use” in its operation manual was insufficient to defeat Caterpillar’s motion because "a manufacturer’s knowledge of the potential and actual intentional abuse of a product does not create a question of fact on the question of reasonably anticipated use when the manufacturer expressly warned against the danger of such misuse.”
Conclusion
For manufacturers whose products are used in Louisiana, the Hardisty decision should be well received, as it offers manufacturers sound guidance for protecting themselves against litigation arising from improper use of their products through the use of strong and clear warning labels. After all, that is why product warning labels exist.
About Our Author
Taylor Brett is a Partner in the New Orleans office and a member of the firm’s Litigation Practice Group. Taylor represents clients across multiple industries, predominately in the energy and natural gas sectors. His work covers a broad spectrum of legal issues involving commercial disputes.